




European Securities and
Markets Authority

Reply form for the Consultation Paper on MAR review report



3 October 2019

Responding to this paper

The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) invites responses to the specific questions listed in the Consultation Paper on the MAR review report published on the ESMA website.

Instructions

Please note that, in order to facilitate the analysis of the large number of responses expected, you are requested to use this file to send your response to ESMA so as to allow us to process it properly. Therefore, ESMA will only be able to consider responses which follow the instructions described below:

- use this form and send your responses in Word format (pdf documents will not be considered except for annexes);
- do not remove the tags of type <ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_1> - i.e. the response to one question has to be framed by the 2 tags corresponding to the question; and
- if you do not have a response to a question, do not delete it and leave the text “TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE” between the tags.

Responses are most helpful:

- if they respond to the question stated;
- indicate the specific question to which the comment relates;
- contain a clear rationale; and
- describe any alternatives ESMA should consider.

Naming protocol

In order to facilitate the handling of stakeholders’ responses please save your document using the following format:

ESMA_CP_MAR_NAMEOFCOMPANY_NAMEOFDOCUMENT.

e.g. if the respondent were ESMA, the name of the reply form would be:

ESMA_CP_MAR_ESMA_REPLYFORM or

ESMA_CP_MAR_ANNEX1

Deadline

Responses must reach us by **29 November 2019**.

All contributions should be submitted online at www.esma.europa.eu under the heading ‘Your input - Consultations’.



Publication of responses

All contributions received will be published following the end of the consultation period, unless otherwise requested. **Please clearly indicate by ticking the appropriate checkbox in the website submission form if you do not wish your contribution to be publicly disclosed. A standard confidentiality statement in an email message will not be treated as a request for non-disclosure.** Note also that a confidential response may be requested from us in accordance with ESMA's rules on access to documents. We may consult you if we receive such a request. Any decision we make is reviewable by ESMA's Board of Appeal and the European Ombudsman.

Data protection

Information on data protection can be found at www.esma.europa.eu under the headings 'Legal notice' and 'Data protection'.



General information about respondent

Name of the company / organisation	NSA
Activity	Investment Services
Are you representing an association?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Country/Region	Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway

Introduction

Please make your introductory comments below, if any:

<ESMA_COMMENT_CP_MAR_1>

The Nordic Securities Association (NSA) welcomes the opportunity to respond to ESMA's consultation paper regarding the MAR review report.

Besides the issues that are included in the consultation paper from ESMA, NSA has a few additional issues that we would like to address to ESMA's attention. These are described below.

Investment recommendations:

NSA is of the view that currently there is not sufficient alignment between the rules on investment recommendations under MAR on one hand, and the rules on investment research and marketing communications and research unbundling under the MiFID II regime. We find that there is an inherent conflict between the obligations under MAR to provide the recommendations free of charge under some circumstances, and the requirements under MiFID II to ensure that research is subject to a separate identifiable payment. Furthermore, we find that the obligations under Article 4 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/958 are not well-suited for the presentation of investment strategies.

<ESMA_COMMENT_CP_MAR_1>

Q1. Do you consider necessary to extend the scope of MAR to spot FX contracts? Please explain the reasons why the scope should or should not be extended, and whether the same goals could be achieved by changing any other piece of the EU regulatory framework.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_1>

NSA believes that the scope of MAR should not be extended to cover spot FX contracts at present. NSA believes that market participants should have sufficient time to adopt to the FX Global Code of Conduct. We support the FX Global Code of Conduct, which is a worldwide global Code.

The spot FX markets are global and reach beyond the environment of the financial industry in the sense that transactions may take place outside banks, investment firms or trading venues. With market participants and currencies from all over the world, the sensitivity and liquidity can vary greatly in different currencies and markets. We believe that the EU should not prematurely move in any direction that would risk causing disadvantage to the EU markets and EU market participants in relation to the global FX markets. The risk that market participants are discouraged from conducting business on the European markets may be higher since the spot FX is a standardized product available everywhere, and such a move would likely have a large impact on the liquidity in the FX markets as a whole. FX transactions are in many situations merely a consequence of another financial or business transaction such as e.g. purchase of goods or services, payments etc. This means that disturbances to the FX markets could potentially affect other areas not only in banking and the financial industry, but to various financial products as well as the business of companies which operate or trade in different countries.

Furthermore, NSA agrees with ESMA that significant analysis and changes to MAR and the MiFID II regime will be required in order to include spot FX contracts within the scope of both regulatory frameworks. Present efforts should be focused on strengthening and improving the functionality and legal certainty of existing regulatory frameworks as they are, rather than expanding their scope.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_1>

Q2. Do you agree with ESMA's preliminary view about the structural changes that would be necessary to apply MAR to spot FX contracts? Please elaborate and indicate if you would consider necessary introducing additional regulatory changes.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_2>

NSA agrees with ESMA's preliminary view about the structural changes that would be necessary to apply MAR to spot FX contracts. However, while ESMA seems to focus mostly on the structures of reporting, it should be stressed that the entire MiFID II regime would need to be revisited if spot FX contracts would be classified as a financial instrument, including transparency rules, client reporting rules, best execution rules etc.

NSA believes that misconduct issues are primarily a product of governance deficiencies. It is our opinion that regulation of spot FX should therefore, at least at initial stage when the outcome is unknown, be focusing on governance and conduct of persons professionally arranging or executing transactions on the spot FX markets.

Traditional spot FX dealing by voice stands for a small portion of the market and is generally conducted OTC either as interbank transactions or with at least one counterparty being a supervised entity. Most spot FX transactions are executed automatically through electronic platforms and through systems in which prices are often generated automatically. There are a number of different service providers and electronic platforms for spot FX transactions, as well as FX brokers. These service providers are often banks or other supervised entities subject to MiFID, bank regulations, but some service providers on the spot FX markets are out of scope of any financial regulations.



We believe that if spot FX should be regulated, it should be on a structural level and not on transactional level. Perhaps the purpose of potential regulation can be fulfilled by demanding that any currently unregulated person which is professionally arranging or executing transactions in spot FX establish proper internal governance and rules of conduct. Any potential regulation should be carefully considered and not discourage developments within fintech, since the whole financial industry often benefit from new technology and electronic solutions.

NSA also notices that contrary to what is the case with a financial instrument, a spot FX transaction does not have an issuer, and we therefore find it hard to see how the rules relating to disclosure of inside information would be applied to spot FX.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_2>

Q3. Do you agree with this analysis? Do you think that the difference between the MAR and BMR definitions raises any market abuse risks and if so what changes might be necessary?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_3>

NSA does not have any comments to this question.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_3>

Q4. Do you agree that the Article 30 of MAR “Administrative sanctions and other administrative measures” should also make reference to administrators of benchmarks and supervised contributors?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_4>

As the BMR is a fairly new regulation and not yet fully implemented, NSA is of the opinion that at this point in time there is no need to implement changes in MAR that relates to BMR. Such a change should await the upcoming review of BMR that will take place in 2020.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_4>

Q5. Do you agree that the Article 23 of MAR “Powers of competent authorities” point (g) should also make reference to administrators of benchmarks and supervised contributors? Do you think that is there any other provision in Article 23 that should be amended to tackle (attempted) manipulation of benchmarks?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_5>

NSA refers our answer to Q4.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_5>

Q6. Do you agree that Article 30 of MAR points (e), (f) and (g) should also make reference to submitters within supervised contributors and assessors within administrators of commodity benchmarks?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_6>

NSA does not agree with ESMA on this point. In the BMR a range of governance and control requirements are laid down, to which the contributors and administrators must comply. If a reference to submitters and assessors is added to Article 30(2), letters (e), (f) and (g) this would mean that administrative sanctions and other administrative measures not only apply on a managerial level but also towards ordinary employees. We believe that it is the responsibility for persons discharging managerial responsibilities to ensure that the internal set-up is in compliance with the regulation, and therefore sanctions for not complying with the regulation should be on managerial level.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_6>

Q7. Do you agree that there is a need to modify the reporting mechanism under Article 5(3) of MAR? Please justify your position.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_7>

NSA welcomes a simplification of the reporting mechanism under Article 5(3). In practice it has shown to be challenging to comply with the regulation, since it can be very difficult to identify all the trading venues where the issuer's shares are being traded. Especially when it comes to MTF's it can be difficult since it can change on a daily basis.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_7>

Q8. If you agree that the reporting mechanism should be modified, do you agree that Option 3 as described is the best way forward? Please justify your position and if you disagree please suggest alternative.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_8>

NSA proposes a combination of Option 2 and Option 3. Meaning that, as a main rule the reporting should be to the NCA of the jurisdiction where the issuer requested admission to trading or has approved trading. If there are several jurisdictions, the reporting should only be to the NCA in the jurisdiction where primary trading is done. This way the issuer only has one point of entry, and if needed the NCA's can share the information on request.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_8>

Q9. Do you agree to remove the obligation for issuers to report under Article 5(3) of MAR information specified in Article 25(1) and (2) of MiFIR? If not, please explain.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_9>

NSA supports a simplification of the reporting requirements. NSA agrees with ESMA that there is no need to require issuers to report to NCAs the information under MiFIR Article 25(1) and 25(2) related to buy-back programmes since the NCAs already have access to the information under MiFIR. For this reason, NSA supports to remove the reference to MiFIR Article 25(1) and 25(2) in MAR Article 5(3).

Furthermore, we do not see the need to align the reporting mechanism under Article 5(3) and 5(4) of MAR with Article 26 of MiFIR. All transactions under a buy-back or stabilisation program are already reported in accordance with Article 26 of MiFIR, and the reference under MAR only means that the NCA's will receive the same data twice. The reporting should be kept to a minimum bearing in mind that the relevant NCA should be able to identify the transactions in their transaction reporting system.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_9>



Q10. Do you agree with the list of fields to be reported by the issuers to the NCA? If not, please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_10>

In general, NSA supports the idea of reducing the number of reporting fields to the NCAs in relation to buy-back programmes. That said, the institutions have today a set-up for the TRS reporting, and they have implemented systems and programmes that can support the reporting to the NCAs in relation to buy-back programmes. If there will be changes to this reporting it will require development of new reporting systems and programmes in the institutions which will have a cost.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_10>

Q11. Do you agree with ESMA's preliminary view?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_11>

NSA agrees with ESMA and supports that the data disclosed to the public should be in an aggregated form, such as aggregated volume traded, and the weighted average price paid for the shares in each trading session.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_11>

Q12. Would you find more useful other aggregated data related to the BBP and if so what aggregated data? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_12>

At this point NSA does not have further comments on this subject.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_12>

Q13. Have market participants experienced any difficulties with identifying what information is inside information and the moment in which information becomes inside information under the current MAR definition?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_13>

NSA agrees with ESMA that identification of inside information can be very complex. Normally the process for identifying circumstances or events which may comprise inside information is less problematic. The experience is rather that the legal assessment of at what moment the information shall be deemed to be of a "precise nature" according to Article 7 may be problematic, especially in cases where the relevant circumstance or event is part of a protracted process which may result in a particular future event but which is not within the control of the issuer (e.g., investigations or reviews by public authorities). For that reason and to get more legal certainty, NSA recommends that ESMA analyzes what could be done to clarify the definition.

In general, when talking about inside information the focus is normally on equities. More guidance on inside information in relation to other financial instruments, such as bonds, derivatives etc. could also be beneficial to have.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_13>



Q14. Do market participants consider that the definition of inside information is sufficient for combatting market abuse?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_14>
Please see our answer to Q13.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_14>

Q15. In particular, have market participants identified information that they would consider as inside information, but which is not covered by the current definition of inside information?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_15>
NSA has not identified information that we consider as inside information, which is not covered by the current definition of inside information.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_15>

Q16. Have market participants identified inside information on commodity derivatives which is not included in the current definition of Article 7(1)(b) of MAR?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_16>
NSA does not have comments to this question.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_16>

Q17. What is an appropriate balance between the scope of inside information relating to commodity derivatives and allowing commodity producers to undertake hedging transactions on the basis of that information, to enable them to carry out their commercial activities and to support the effective functioning of the market?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_17>
NSA does not have comments to this question.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_17>

Q18. As of today, does the current definition of Article 7(1)(b) of MAR allow commodity producers to hedge their commercial activities? In this respect, please provide information on hedging difficulties encountered.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_18>
NSA does not have comments to this question.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_18>

Q19. Please provide your views on whether the general definition of inside information of Article 7(1)(a) of MAR could be used for commodity derivatives. In such case, would safeguards enabling commodity producers to undertake hedging transactions based on proprietary inside information related to their commercial activities be needed? Which types of safeguards would you envisage?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_19>
NSA does not have comments to this question.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_19>

Q20. What changes could be made to include other cases of front running?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_20>
NSA does not see a need to extend the scope.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_20>

Q21. Do you consider that specific conditions should be added in MAR to cover front-running on financial instruments which have an illiquid market?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_21>
In the assessment of whether certain information constitutes inside information, the likelihood of a significant effect on the price of a financial instrument shall be assessed. For the purpose of assessing potential price movements, the liquidity of a financial instrument or market is one of the determining factors and subsequently it should already under current regulation be part of the assessment.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_21>

Q22. What market abuse and/or conduct risks could arise from pre-hedging behaviours and what systems and controls do firms have in place to address those risks? What measures could be used in MAR or other legislation to address those risks?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_22>

NSA is of the opinion that pre-hedging is a vital element in order to ensure liquidity in the financial markets, as well as an important tool for a bank or investment firm to effectively manage its risk. Pre-hedging is to the benefit of customers by enabling investment service providers to offer competitive pricing and may in certain cases be necessary in order for certain transactions to even be possible to execute. Any regulation should be carefully considered, and pre-hedging should not be deemed as misuse of client information, provided that the pre-hedging is performed in pursuit of the legitimate activities in the provision of investment services or as market maker or liquidity provider. We would like to emphasize that if pre-hedging of orders and transactions be further limited, there is an apparent risk that the market for certain financial instruments will disappear to the detriment of the investors and the market.

NSA supports transparency in trading practices by disclosing to the customer, where appropriate, that pre-hedging might be necessary before an exact price can be offered.

MiFID II/MiFIR conduct rules include the obligation for investment firms to act honestly, fairly and professionally in a manner which promotes the integrity of the market (Article 24 of MiFIR) and to act in accordance with the best interest of clients (Article 24 of MiFID II). These rules address the risk of inappropriate behaviour in the interdealer market and in customer facing activities. Trading venues also conduct monitoring to detect any inappropriate behaviour that may jeopardize the fair and efficient operation of the market. Investment firms are also required to include pre-hedging activities in their own monitoring and surveillance according to Article 16 of MAR.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_22>

Q23. What benefits do pre-hedging behaviours provide to firms, clients and to the functioning of the market?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_23>

NSA believes that pre-hedging is conducted in the interest of and for the benefit of the customer to enable the investment firm to be able to provide a price or quote and ensure successful execution and completion of a transaction.

It is important to note that pre-hedging is a by-product of other transactions which might not be possible to conduct unless it is possible to pre-hedge this risk, for example bond issuances and M&A transactions or illiquid currencies, rates or financial instruments. If a bank would assume risk in a customer transaction that it will not be able to hedge, it would increase risks in the trading book and increase cost of funds. This may discourage banks or investment firms from conducting transactions thus impacting the liquidity and the risks in the whole financial system.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_23>

Q24. What financial instruments are subject to pre-hedging behaviours and why?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_24>

Financial instruments trading in OTC markets where investment firms trade in principal capacity.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_24>

Q25. Please provide your views on the functioning of the conditions to delay disclosure of inside information and on whether they enable issuers to delay disclosure of inside information where necessary.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_25>

NSA welcomes ESMA's initiative to look at the conditions to delay disclosure of inside information.

In general NSA finds the process for delaying inside information very extensive and requires a lot of administrative resources.

The introduction of MAR – and the abandonment of the former regime where occurrence of inside information usually happened simultaneously with disclosure - has prompted the need to delay disclosure. Delay of disclosure is a narrow exemption from the obligation to disclose ASAP. It would be beneficiary to

have the exemption broadened (or even made the rule), so the more interests were considered “legitimate”, e.g. general timing interests and internal governance procedures. In our view, this would not deteriorate the information provided to the market. Rather it would minimize the risk of misleading the market, by providing information about events, which may be likely to occur – but about which uncertainties still exists.

The ESMA MAR Guidelines regarding delayed disclosure of inside information (the “Delay Guidelines”) generally encompass situations related to M&A activities or financial difficulties when providing examples of situations in which it could be in the legitimate interest of the issuer to delay the disclosure.

It would be beneficial if the Delay Guidelines could be further developed to also include different types of issuers, as well as examples of other situations in which inside information may arise and there may be a legitimate reason for the issuer to delay the disclosure. Such situations could for example include ongoing, protracted, inspections or reviews by public authorities in which the outcome of such investigation or review would likely be jeopardised by immediate public disclosure. It could also be a situation where an issuer is listed on multiple venues in different time zones and where delayed disclosure would be beneficial to protect the integrity of the financial markets.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_25>

Q26. Please provide relevant examples of difficulties encountered in the assessment of the conditions for the delay or in the application of the procedure under Article 17(4) of MAR.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_26>

NSA would like to address ESMA’s attention to cases, where the issuers’ view of what constitutes “legitimate interests” differed very much from the view of the regulator (inter alia related to dismissal of leading employees), which has led to unnecessary uncertainties in relation to what constitutes “legitimate interests”, both on the part of the issuer and the regulator.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_26>

Q27. Please provide your view on the inclusion of a requirement in MAR for issuers to have systems and controls for identifying, handling, and disclosing inside information. What would the impact be of introducing a systems and controls requirement for issuers?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_27>

NSA is of the opinion that it is not necessary to include a specific requirement in MAR for issuers to have systems and controls for identifying, handling, and disclosing inside information as an issuer already today must, in practice, have such systems and controls in place to comply with their obligations under article 17 MAR. Contrary to the situation under article 16 MAR, article 17 MAR is applicable to a large group of issuers varying in scale, size, and nature of business which. In our opinion, it would have to render any requirement in MAR and supporting guidelines to be of such high-level and generic nature that it would only create unnecessary complexity and uncertainties for the issuers without any corresponding gain in the efficiency of their controls and systems compared to the current situation.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_27>

Q28. Please provide examples of cases in which the identification of when an information became “inside information” was problematic.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_28>

Normally the process for identifying circumstances or events which may comprise inside information is less problematic. The legal assessment of when the information at hand shall be deemed to be of a “precise nature” according to Article 7 MAR may in some cases be problematic if the circumstances or event is part of a protracted process that may result in a particular future event, but which is not within the issuer’s control.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_28>

Q29. Please provide your views on the notification to NCAs of the delay of disclosure of inside information, in those cases in which the relevant information loses its inside nature following the decision to delay the disclosure.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_29>

NSA does not see a need for extending the scope of MAR Article 17(4) to also include notification to NCA of the delay of disclosure of inside information, in those cases in which the relevant information loses its inside nature following the decision to delay the disclosure. When information subsequently loses the element of price sensitivity and the information therefore ceases to be inside information, we do not see it as being in scope for MAR. We furthermore note that the NCAs and/or other public authorities already as of today has far-reaching authority to request information on an *ad hoc* basis in connection with any investigation or criminal proceeding relating to insider dealing or other market abuse.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_29>

Q30. Please provide your views on whether Article 17(5) of MAR has to be made more explicit to include the case of a listed issuer, which is not a credit or financial institution, but which is controlling, directly or indirectly, a listed or non-listed credit or financial institution.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_30>

NSA supports an amendment of Article 17(5) MAR in order to clarify that in case a listed issuer which is not a credit or financial institution, but which is directly or indirectly controlling a listed or non-listed credit or financial institution, receives information regarding financial difficulties in a credit or financial institution, it should be able to delay the disclosure of such information on the same basis as the credit or financial institution under Article 17(5). This would be in line with the goal to achieve the overarching principle of said Article; i.e., to safeguard the financial stability of the Institution and of the financial system.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_30>

Q31. Please provide relevant examples of difficulties encountered in the assessment of the conditions for the delay or in the application of Article 17(5) of MAR.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_31>

NSA does not have any comments to this question.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_31>

Q32. Please indicate whether you have found difficulties in the assessment of the obligation to disclose a piece of inside information under Article 17 MAR when analysed together with other obligations arising from CRD, CRR or BRRD. Please provide specific examples.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_32>

NSA does not have further examples. However, there have been situations in which supervisory authorities have implied that they expect an issuer to abstain from the disclosure of certain information received by it from such authorities (e.g., as part of an ongoing inspections), which results in a difficult position for the issuer (especially when such authority is also the competent authority under MAR).

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_32>

Q33. Do you agree with the proposed amendments to Article 11 of MAR?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_33>

NSA welcomes a clarification of Article 11 of MAR, since there appears to be different interpretation of the said Article.

NSA does not share the view that ESMA has stated in point 142. In point 142 it is stated that ESMA is of the view that, when carrying out a market sounding, DMPs are under the obligation to follow the requirements set out in Article 11 and when they do so, they can benefit from the described protection.

NSA is not of the opinion that there is an obligation to follow the requirements set out in Article 11. Article 11 is to be viewed as a safe harbour regulation. This is also supported by recital 35 stating that *There should be no presumption that market participants that do not comply with this Regulation when conducting a market sounding have unlawfully disclosed inside information, but they should not be able to take advantage of the exemption given to those who have complied with such provisions. The question whether they have infringed the prohibition against unlawful disclosure of inside information should be analysed in light of all the relevant provisions of this Regulation, and all disclosing market participants should be under an obligation to record in writing their assessment, before engaging in a market sounding, whether that market sounding will involve the disclosure of inside information.* NSA agrees with ESMA that if a DMP seek to have the protection as described in Article 11, the DMP will have to follow all the requirements laid down in Commission delegated regulation 2016/960.

NSA is of the opinion that the market sounding procedures should continue to be optional for an issuer, a secondary offeror of a financial instrument, an emission allowance market participant and a third party acting on behalf or on the account of the above mentioned. If they choose to use the market sounding regime in MAR, it cannot be questioned whether they have disclosed inside information or not. On the other hand, if they choose to market sound in other ways, they do not gain the protection given in Article 11 in MAR. NSA supports to keep the flexibility. For that reason, NSA does not support ESMA's proposed amendments.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_33>

Q34. Do you think that some limitation to the definition of market sounding should be introduced (e.g. excluding certain categories of transactions) or that additional clarification on the scope of the definition of market sounding should be provided?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_34>



NSA would like to raise ESMA's attention to the challenges that has been experienced with market sounding in relation to investors (buy-side). Often investors do not want to be sounded due to the restrictions being imposed on them. This can be an issue for the investment firms when they seek to gauge the interest of potential investors in a possible transaction.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_34>

Q35. What are in your view the stages of the interaction between DMPs and potential investors, from the initial contact to the execution of the transaction, that should be covered by the definition of market soundings?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_35>

NSA does not have any comments to this question.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_35>

Q36. Do you think that the reference to “prior to the announcement of a transaction” in the definition of market sounding is appropriate or whether it should be amended to cover also those communications of information not followed by any specific announcement?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_36>

NSA believes that Article 11(1) with advantage could be clarified with adding “expected” before *prior to the announcement of a transaction*. The reason for this suggestion is, that it is not always the case that a public announcement will follow a market sounding, for example if the transactions does not take place. In cases where a sounding is not followed by an announcement the regulation must give some guidance on for how long clients being sounded are in possession of inside information.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_36>

Q37. Can you provide information on situations where the market soundings regime has proven to be of difficult application by DMPs or persons receiving the market sounding? Could you please elaborate?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_37>

As stated above in Q34, the use of the market sounding regime is limited due to the restrictions imposed on the investors. Hence, it would be helpful if the burdens on the RMPs are reduced so that the RMP are more inclined to be market sounded and/or that certain interactions are excluded from the regime (as is the case for the private placement exemption).

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_37>

Q38. Can you provide your views on how to simplify or improve the market sounding procedure and requirements while ensuring an adequate level of audit trail of the conveyed information (in relation to both the DMPs and the persons receiving the market sounding)?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_38>

The market sounding procedures may also be used, even though the market participant considers that the market sounding will not involve disclosure of inside information. The procedure to be followed in these situations are limited compared to the case where inside information will be disclosed. NSA is of the opinion that there is no need for setting up procedures for the cases where no inside information will be disclosed. NSA believes that market sounding only relates to inside information and therefore there is no need for having market sounding procedure in place when not disclosing inside information.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_38>

Q39. Do you agree with ESMA’s preliminary view on the usefulness of insider list? If not, please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_39>

Keeping an insider list is an extensive task since it requires a lot of information to be maintained. NSA is of the opinion that too much unnecessary information is included in the insider list and the requirement of information have resulted in administrative burden and costs. The main purpose with the information in the insider list template must be, that the information gives the national competent authorities the possibility to identify the relevant private individuals who have received inside information. I.e. only adequate, relevant data should be included, and information should not be excessive in relation to the purpose of the insider list. By comparison in the TRS reporting the national identification number is assessed sufficient to identify a private individual.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_39>

Q40. Do you consider that the insider list regime should be amended to make it more effective? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_40>

Please see our comments to question 39.

NSA recognizes the difference between actual access and potential access to inside information and welcome the possibility to exclude persons from insider lists where possible. To be clear, however, we do not believe that having individuals listed as insiders due to potential access in any way reduces the usefulness of the insider list, as long as the reason for each individual to be listed as an insider is correctly detailed in the “Function and reason for being insider” field in the insider list.

We believe that ESMA should allow issuers to include or exclude individuals with potential access to inside information as they please, as the administrative burden to check which individuals with potential access actually have “gained access” may be heavy for some issuers where technological or administrative means are lacking, but very light for other issuers with effective measures of access logging and reporting already in place. Issuers should therefore be free to decide for themselves which solution would be most beneficial for them.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_40>

Q41. What changes and what systems and controls would issuers need to put in place in order to be able to provide NCAs, at their request, the insider list with the individuals who had actually accessed the inside information within a short time period?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_41>



NSA refers to the answer to Q40.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_41>

Q42. What are your views about expanding the scope of Article 18(1) of MAR (i.e. drawing up and maintain the insider list) to include any person performing tasks through which they have access to inside information, irrespective of the fact that they act on behalf or on account of the issuer? Please identify any other cases that you consider appropriate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_42>

NSA is opposed to the notion of expanding the scope of Article 18 (1) of MAR, as the regulation already obligates the Issuers or any person acting on their behalf of or on their account to maintain insider lists. From a market viewpoint, independent auditors and notaries as mentioned in point 176 of the MAR Review will be included in either the list of the issuer, the financial institution (acting on their behalf of or on their account) or another advisor (acting on the issuers behalf or on their account) in accordance with Article 18 (1) of MAR and the spirit of Recital (57) of MAR, if they gain access to inside information.

Expanding on the above requirement for independent third parties to draw up insider lists themselves does not seem to add further value to the setup and governance surrounding the insider list regime. Consequently, adding additional requirements to further scope out indirect insiders would be imposing a regulatory obligation already covered by Article 18 (1) of MAR.

For the avoidance of any doubt, we strongly oppose that ESMA changes the overall scope of Article 18 (1) of MAR to encompass any person with insider information and not “only” issuers and persons acting on their behalf of or on their account.

In a worst-case scenario, we see a risk of local authorities interpreting third parties very broadly. This would potentially require us to place staff working in market functions on insider lists, if they handle e.g. orders from clients of a certain size or block trades that would be seen as inside information. To handle such insider lists (based on our activities), we would either need to invest heavily in systems to be able to handle the dynamics of the restriction activities or have a full time restriction for every Sales and Dealer in Equities/FI&C. It would increase our costs in an environment, where our model is already significantly under pressure. On top of this, we would be concerned about any spill-over effects towards the clients. This would also place a very heavy administrative burden on the companies required to maintain insider lists, without it adding any value when it comes to e.g. monitoring and trade surveillance.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_42>

Q43. Do you consider useful maintaining the permanent insider section? If yes, please elaborate on your reasons for using the permanent insider section and who should be included in that section in your opinion.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_43>

NSA supports keeping the permanent insider lists, but the permanent list should not substitute the ad hoc lists.

The permanent list supports efficient information flows with senior management when discussing insider matters thus enabling effective decision-making. By not having a permanent insider list or making the interpretation too narrow this can increase the operational risk associated with this process (i.e. increase risk that all individuals are not being added on the relevant event based insider lists). It may also hinder



effective and timely senior management communication or decision-making as individuals will be unsure of who can be included in conversations and whether they can/have been wall crossed.

However, it will be positive to have ESMA clarify who should be added to the permanent insider list in order to provide greater consistency in the way this is interpreted across the market. We find that ESMA's comment in paragraph 183 (b) is very narrow and we could advise that a broader interpretation of permanent insider's is applied. In practice, the Executive Board members and Board of Directors are typically considered to be permanent insiders. This encompasses a wider group of individuals than those mentioned by ESMA in paragraph 183 (b), e.g. members of the executive board that are business unit representatives. The interpretation of the permanent insiders should therefore be based on the scale, complexity and roles within organisations.

In conclusion, bearing in mind, that the permanent insider list should never substitute the ad hoc lists, we strongly oppose the notion set forth by ESMA in comment 183 (b), that only the CEO and in certain specific cases the CFO, Chairman of the board, Head of Legal and STO should be on the list. In our view, it must be allowed to have the all members of the executive board and board of directors on the list, to ensure that information may flow freely amongst key decision makers, and also to mitigate the risk of unlawful disclosure amongst the members of the executive board and the board of directors and/or necessitating members of those bodies to be excluded from meetings and discussion of important issues.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_43>

Q44. Do you agree with ESMA's preliminary view?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_44>

NSA agrees with ESMA's preliminary view and supports a specification stating that the issuer should only include one contact natural person for each legal person acting on behalf or for the account of the issuer having access to inside information.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_44>

Q45. Do you have any other suggestion on the insider lists that would support more efficiently their objectives while reducing the administrative work they entail? If yes, please elaborate how those changes could contribute to that purpose.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_45>

NSA refers to the comments to Q39 above.

Further, NSA suggests that to ease the administrative burden on keeping lists less information should be required, but still enough to identify the persons/legal person (identified by company registration number) on the lists. This suggestion is also to align with information that is provided in relation to MIFID II. Our suggestion is to have the following fields, name, national ID, work phone, work e-mail, reason for becoming insider and time of becoming insider.

If legal persons acting on behalf or on the account of the issuer are explicitly required through Article 18 to keep their own insider list, then there should also be included a responsibility for issuers to notify such legal persons acting on their behalf or their account whenever they have shared information that the issuer classifies as inside information with them. Such a notification could be very simple but to the point and should be in writing.



<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_45>

Q46. Does the minimum reporting threshold have to be increased from Euro 5,000? If so, what threshold would ensure an appropriate balance between transparency to the market, preventing market abuse and the reporting burden on issuers, PDMRs, and closely associated persons?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_46>

NSA supports a general increase of the threshold to at least 20,000 Euro across the EU, as this will make it easier for undertakings operating within different EU member states when handling the reporting requirement. NSA supports one single threshold throughout the EU without any national option to increase the threshold further.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_46>

Q47. Should NCAs still have the option to keep a higher threshold? In that case, should the optional threshold be higher than Euro 20,000? If so, please describe the criteria to be used to set the higher optional threshold (by way of example, the liquidity of the financial instrument, or the average compensation received by the managers).

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_47>

The NCA's should not have an option to keep a higher threshold, cf. comments in Q46 above, and it would be administrative burdensome for issuers operating in several EU countries to oversee different thresholds. By having the same threshold in every country, firms can rely on just one internal instruction applicable.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_47>

Q48. Did you identify alternative criteria on which the reporting threshold could be based? Please explain why.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_48>

NSA does not have comments to this question.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_48>

Q49. On the application of this provision for EAMPs: have issues or difficulties been experienced?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_49>

NSA does not have comments to this question.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_49>

Q50. Did you identify alternative criteria on which the subsequent notifications could be based? Please explain why.



<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_50>

NSA has not identified any alternative criteria, besides having one threshold, on which subsequent notifications could be based.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_50>

Q51. Do you consider that the 20% threshold included in Article 19(1a)(a) and (b) is appropriate? If not, please explain the reason why and provide examples in which the 20% threshold is not effective.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_51>

NSA finds that the 20% threshold is appropriate. However, we would also appreciate to include a corresponding threshold in Article 19(11) MAR in order to clarify the connectivity between Article 19(1) (i.e., the scope of the notification obligation) and Article 19(11) (i.e., the closed period) since it cannot be correct that a non-notifiable transaction under Article 19(1) should be in scope of the closed period prohibition.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_51>

Q52. Have you identified any possible alternative system to set the threshold in relation to managers' transactions where the issuer's shares or debt instruments form part of a collective investment undertaking or provide exposure to a portfolio of assets?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_52>

NSA does not have comments to this question.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_52>

Q53. Did you identify elements of Article 19(11) of MAR which in your view could be amended? If yes, why? Have you identified alternatives to the closed period?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_53>

NSA proposes that Article 19(11) MAR is amended in order to exclude dealings by a PDMR in conjunction with certain corporate events in which a PDMR is not treated differently than any other shareholder, for example when (i) subscribing (or undertaking to subscribe) for the PDMR's pro rata share in a rights issue or (ii) accepting (or undertaking to accept) a public takeover offer.

Furthermore, we also propose that all transactions executed under a discretionary asset management mandate are excluded from the prohibition to trade during the closed period since the PDMR has no possibility to influence or affect any transactions by the asset manager.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_53>

Q54. Market participants are requested to indicate if the current framework to identify the closed period is working well or if clarifications are sought.



<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_54>
NSA does not have comments to this question.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_54>

Q55. Please provide your views on extending the requirement of Article 19(11) to (i) issuers, and to (ii) persons closely associated with PDMRs. Please indicate which would be the impact on issuers and persons closely associated with PDMRs, including any benefits and downsides.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_55>
NSA does not support an extension of Article 19 (11) to issuers. Extending a blanket prohibition would further limit transactional windows significantly. Considering that issuers need approximately a week following a trade date for settlement of the securities, a thirty days closed period before each quarterly reporting will effectively close issuance windows for blackout by 4-5 months each year. As markets are volatile, a reduction of the issuance window will materially increase execution risks. This is especially of importance for frequent issuers. As publication of quarterly results is often done within 30 days after the quarter end, there may not be information available at such an early stage that could be considered precise information about the upcoming quarterly result. Hence, we see no reason for prolonging the silent period blackout which issuers already apply too.

NSA does not support an extension of Article 19(11) to also include persons closely associated with PDMRs. This will, as also mentioned by ESMA, place extra burdens on the PDMRs and the issuers. Also, in MiFID II personal transactions covers relevant persons which does not include closely associated persons.

The administrative set-up that will be required to apply to such a rule would not be proportionate with the purpose of the rule.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_55>

Q56. Please provide your views on the extension of the immediate sale provided by Article 19(12)(a) to financial instruments other than shares. Please explain which financial instruments should be included and why.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_56>
NSA supports the suggestion from ESMA to extend the immediate sale provided by Article 19(12)(a) to cover other financial instruments that just shares. We do not see a need to differentiate between shares and other financial instruments.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_56>

Q57. Please provide your views on whether, in addition to the criteria in Article 19(12) (a) and (b), other criteria resulting in further cases of exemption from the closed period obligation could be considered.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_57>
NSA proposes that ESMA looks into the possibility to extend the exemption to also include situations where a person having a pension scheme are forced to sell financial instruments in order to be able to pay the required taxes by year-end.

With reference to ESMA's statement relating to cases when a contract relating to a certain issuer's financial instrument was executed by a PDMR outside of the closed period but require completion during the closed period, we would like to highlight that such delivery of financial instruments should already under the current MAR regime be allowed. Hence, it should not be added to the list of exemptions under Article 19(12) since such transactions are not at all within the scope of Article 19 MAR. Where a decision to trade is made outside of the closed period, the PDMR is not trading during the closed period, nor is there any other conduct by the PDMR during the closed period as the contract requires the acquisition or sale of the relevant financial instruments (cf. Article 9(3) MAR which states that performing a contractual obligation entered into prior to possessing inside information shall not be considered insider dealing).

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_57>

Q58. Do you consider that CIUs admitted to trading or trading on a trading venue should be differentiated with respect to other issuers? Please elaborate your response specifically with respect to PDMR obligations, disclosure of inside information and insider lists. In this regard, please consider whether you could identify any articulation or consistency issues between MAR and the EU or national regulations for the different types of CIUs, with regards for example to transparency requirements under MAR vis-à-vis market timing or front running issues.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_58>

NSA does not have any comments to this question.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_58>

Q59. Do you agree with ESMA's preliminary view? Please indicate which transactions should be captured by PDMR obligations in the case of management companies of CIUs.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_59>

NSA does not have any comments to this question.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_59>

Q60. Do you agree with ESMA's preliminary view? If not, please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_60>

NSA does not have any comments to this question.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_60>

Q61. What persons should PDMR obligations apply to depending on the different structures of CIUs and why? In particular, please indicate whether the definition of "relevant persons" would be adequate for CIUs other than UCITs and AIFs.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_61>

NSA does not have any comments to this question.



<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_61>

Q62. ESMA would like to gather views from stakeholders on whether other entities than the asset management company (e.g. depository) and other entities on which the CIUs has delegated the execution of certain tasks should be captured by the PDMR regime.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_62>
NSA does not have any comments to this question.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_62>

Q63. Do you agree with ESMA's conclusion? If not, please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_63>
NSA does not have any comments to this question.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_63>

Q64. Do you agree with ESMA preliminary view? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_64>
NSA does not have any comments to this question.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_64>

Q65. Do you agree with ESMA's preliminary views? Do you consider that specific obligations are needed for elaborating insider lists related to CIUs admitted to traded or traded on a trading venue?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_65>
NSA does not have any comments to this question.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_65>

Q66. Please provide your views on the abovementioned harmonisation of reporting formats of order book data. In addition, please provide your views on the impact and cost linked to the implementation of new common standards to transmit order book data to NCAs upon request. Please provide your views on the consequences of using XML templates or other types of templates.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_66>
NSA does not have any comments to this question.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_66>

Q67. Please provide your views on the impact and cost linked to the establishment of a regular reporting mechanism of order book data.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_67>
NSA does not have any comments to this question.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_67>

Q68. In particular, please: a) elaborate on the cost differences between a daily reporting system and a daily record keeping and ad-hoc transmission mechanism; b) explain if and how the impact would change by limiting the scope of a regular reporting mechanism of order book data to a subset of financial instruments. In that context, please provide detailed description of the criteria that you would use to define the appropriate scope of financial instruments for the order book reporting.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_68>
NSA does not have any comments to this question.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_68>

Q69. What are your views regarding those proposed amendments to MAR?

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_69>
NSA supports the intent that NCAs have possibility to cooperate and share information with tax authorities upon request, including an exchange of information across EU. However, those needs should be addressed in separate legislation as they fall outside the parameters of MAR.

Without any suggested rules it is difficult to provide concrete comments related to possible obligations for regulated entities. New regulation should not increase administrative, reporting or monitoring requirements to regulated entities.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_69>

Q70. Are you in favour of amending Article 30(1) second paragraph of MAR so that all NCAs in the EU have the capacity of imposing administrative sanctions? If yes, please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_70>
NSA agrees with ESMA that there is no need to modify MAR Article 30(1). The use of criminal sanctions should be on Member States own discretion and not regulated in MAR.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_70>

Q71. Please share your views on the elements described above.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_71>



ESMA mentions that the NCAs consider it an issue if a person fails to pay a fine and leaves the territory of the competent NCA. There are established frameworks for cooperation in relation to enforceability of claims and exequaturs, as well as international treaties. We see a potential conflict in relation to rules relating to e.g. bankruptcy proceedings and claims in general. It is our opinion that a fine should be treated as any other claim and be enforceable subject to established frameworks.

An NCA may have investigatory powers after a person has left the territory and can in some cases proceed with its investigation regardless. If that NCA were able to claim fines through another NCA, it must be considered whether it would be an unfair advantage in relation to other creditors or investors, to not affect the willingness to lend to or invest in a company. The criminal character of MAR also calls for careful consideration of principles of justice and the reach of a competent authority.

As a general remark relating to sanctions and measure, we would like to raise that in respect of market manipulation, insider trading and manipulation of benchmarks, there are conflicting views between member states due to the possibility to opt out from implementing certain prohibitions of MAR if there is local criminal law that capture certain behavior. We believe that it is necessary to address this issue and the fact that there may be conflicts depending on local implementation of MAR and criminal laws of respective member states. A conflict in this respect entails that investment firms in some jurisdictions are forced to take precautions by implementing more stringent procedures based on the fear that its employees can be prosecuted for aiding and abetting market abuse from the mere loyal execution of client orders. The same situation could arise when employees perform their duties on behalf of an entity in the course of its activities under the BMR. These issues should be carefully considered.

<ESMA_QUESTION_CP_MAR_71>